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THE ADEQUACY OF STATE INSURANCE RATE
REGULATION: THE McCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVEt

Spencer L. Kimball* and Ronald N. Boyce**
NY substantial inquiry into the functioning of the insurance
commissioner in American society poses the question, at the
threshold of the inquiry, whether state regulatory power over
the insurance business is likely to continue, or whether insurance
will fall increasingly under the aegis of the federal government.
This article seeks to ascertain the minimum conditions for the
permanent preservation of state regulatory power over the insurance business, and to determine whether they are now satisfied.
These conditions may be summarily stated: the Congress of the
United States has shmm its willingness to apply federal antitn1st
and marketing legislation to the insurance business, to the extent
that the states do not regulate. Application of such statutes would
have destructive impact on the present structure of the insurance
business. Even more important, it seems possible that once the
federal government entered the field of insurance regulation,
the scope of its intervention might increase until it occupied
the field. Though rate regulation has been one of the lesser functions of the state insurance commissioner, federal concern with
combinations of insurers to fix premium rates has now made adequate state regulation of rate making pivotal for the preservation
of state control over insurance. Unless the commissioner is able
to perform his statutory duty of regulating rates well enough to
prevent effective pressures for federal regulation, he may cease
to have any role to play in our society.

A

THE FUNCTION OF RATE MAKING AND RATE REGULATION

In its nature, insurance is a mutual enterprise. Basically it
is a scheme by which the individual's insurable risks are distribtThe authors gratefully acknowledge a grant from the University of Utah Research
Fund which made this project possible. The material on Wisconsin law was obtained
at the University of Wisconsin under a research grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.
•Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-'Ed.
••Member of the Utah Bar.-Ed.
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uted among a large group of persons, each policyholder making a
contribution in the form of an advance premium or a post hoc
assessment toward the totality of losses incurred by the group.
The nature and internal operation of the corporate (or other)
structure of the enterprise must be subjected to legal control,
to the end that reasonable expectations of policyholders be not
frustrated. So also the adequacy of the rate structure must be
assured, for if the insurance fund is not large enough to pay
losses, the scheme does not give protection. The essentially cooperative character of the insurance business, even when organized for private profit, gives both the policyholder and
company a stake in the long-run adequacy of insurance premiums.1 In mutual or non-profit companies, the policyholder has
little legitimate concern to set maximum premiums, for dividends
restore overpayments to him. In nonparticipating stock companies, however, overpayments are profits, and policyholders, who
do not participate in them, have an interest in making sure
that premiums are not excessive. In both kinds of company,
policyholders have an interest in seeing that the rate structure
is not unreasonably discriminatory.
The adequacy of rates is basic to the very existence of the
insurance institution; the prevention of excessive or discriminatory rates goes to the fairness of marketing practices. Rate
regulation seeks to bring the rate structure of the business
under public control for the achievement of the twin objectives
of adequacy of the insurance fund and fairness of premium
charges.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF RATE REGULATION

As a feature of the commissioner's activity, rate regulation
is of recent origin. Patterson described it in 1927 as "embryonic" ;2 even after thirty more years it is still much less sophisticated
and thorough than public utility rate regulation. 3 Perhaps insurance rate regulation has developed slowly because of the
high degree of competition prevalent in the industry. Capital
1 Even stock insurance company men insist on "·the essential mutuality of all insurance." See ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF FIRE UNDERWRITERS' AssoCIATION OF THE NORTHWEST
29, 32 (1896). In the short-run, capital and surplus requirements may ensure that a temporary inadequacy of premiums will not destroy a stock company.
2 PATTERSON, THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER IN THE UNITED STATES 268 (1927).
3 In 1955, Patterson said it was still "one of the least effective phases of insurance
regulation." CAsEs AND MATERIALS ON INSURANCE, 3d ed., 43 (1955).
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and surplus requirements for stock companies, and assessability
of policyholders for mutuals, gave some assurance that inadequacy of the fund be not a disaster. Though inadequate rates
constitute a graver danger to the insuring public than excessive
or discriminatory ones, a high degree of sophistication about
insurance must precede control to insure adequacy of rates.
Thus a high level of competition, which kept premiums from
being grossly excessive, forestalled effective regulation until well
into the twentieth century, even though there were many periods
in insurance history when rates were inadequate. An 1839 corporate charter expressed the attitude of the whole nineteenth century; it authorized the company to charge "such premium or
consideration . . . as may be agreed on between the said corporation and the party or parties agreeing with them." 4
Historically, fire insurance losses seemed to follow cyclical
patterns. When the loss ratio was low and profits high, the prospect of large profits attracted newcomers to the insurance business. 5 Companies were easy to start; neither experience nor
elaborate physical plant were essential. A rented office, a few
clerks, some solicitors on straight commission, and the capital
fund required by statute, were all that was necessary. Unsophisticated early fire insurance rating put flat rates of perhaps $1 per
$100 on brick construction, and $2 per $100 on frame. Later,
agents and field men made inspections and worked out a rough
rating schedule, but only in the last third of the nineteenth
century did a scientific rating plan supported by statistics begin
to develop. 6 Premium volume might be enormous in relation
to capital, and a new company might easily enjoy the illusion
of large profits if its accounting practices did not provide for
adequate reinsurance reserves, for income in the expansive phase
of the business greatly exceeded outgo, even if the business
were actuarially insolvent. 7 Hence overconfident underwriting
with rates driven down to uneconomic levels by exessive competition might go undetected until a catastrophic fire wiped
weak companies out of existence with great loss to policyholders.
In 1877 the president of the Fire Underwriters' Association of
4 Wis. Laws 1838-1839, No. 36.
5 BREARLEY, THE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL :BOARD OF FIRE UNDERWRITERS

286 (1916) [hereinafter cited as

9-10, 285-

BREARLEY].
6 WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE FIRE INS. INVESTIGATING COMM. REP. 38 (1913).
7 This illusion was recognized in SIXTH ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF FIRE UNDERWRITERS'
AssN. OF N.W. 130-131 (1875); see also id. at 200.
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the Northwest stated that about 4000 insurance companies had
come into existence at one time or another, and that only I 000
remained. 8 An industry committee reporting in 1850 alleged
that from the beginning to 1810 the fire insurance business was
profitable, that from 1811 to 1830 it produced an average profit of
about three percent on capital investment, while during the years
from 1831 to 1850 the entire business was carried on at a great
loss of capital. The committee said there was a loss for the entire
period from 1791 to 1850.9 Whether these statements were accurate or not, they represented industry belief, and explain the
insurance fraternity's attitude toward price fixing combinations.10
Faced with periodic threats to the integrity and profitableness
of their business, insurance men sought to rationalize the making
of rates. As early as 1806 companies made informal agreements
on rates,11 and by 1819 there were local boards whose members
undertook not to depart from established premium rates.12 Not
until after the Civil War were rate-fixing combinations effective, however. In 1865 and 1866 losses skyrocketed and a felt
need to end chaotic competition resulted in the 1866 organization of The National Board of Fire Underwriters. The board's
objective was "to establish and maintain, as far as practicable, a
system of uniform rates of premium." But the habit of decades
of uncontrolled competition was not so easily broken, and within
five years the board became virtually moribund under pressure
of relentless competitive forces. Perhaps rationalization of the
industry would have been delayed indefinitely had it not been
for the Chicago and Boston fires of 1871 and 1872. Scores of
companies went ,to the wall in the aftermath of these catastrophes and out of them came real impetus for the formation of rate
making combinations. Although competitive forces continually
reasserted themselves, concerted rate making was thereafter the
normal pattern. The National Board immediately revived. Regional and state, and even city, boards were organized, all directed
to the restraint of anarchic competition.13
SEIGHTH ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF FIRE UNDERWRITERS' AssN. OF N.W. 17 (1877).
BREARLEY, 284-286.
10 Insurance men saw the board, not as a monopoly, but merely as an association for
statistical purposes. See TucKETT's MONTHLY INSURANCE JOURNAL, July 1852, as quoted in
BREARLEY, 287.
11 Id. at 283.
12 The Salamander Society was founded in New York City in 1819. Id. at 249. WANDEL,
THE CONTROL OF COMPETITION IN FIRE INSURANCE 15 (1935) [hereinafter cited as WANDEL].
13 BREARLEY, 1-50. See WANDEL, 15-32, for a detailed statement of organizations.
9
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Difficulties with the enforcement of concerted rate making
led to constant effort to develop new methods. National concert broke down and was replaced by regional organizations
in the 1880's. The National Board shifted its attention to fire
prevention and insurance statistics, though it still exercised persuasive influence to help maintain the local rating organizations.14
In the 1880's the compact system developed, with heightenea
emphasis on the locality as the scene for agreements among local
agents to respect the rates set by compact managers. 15 Since the
commission method of compensating soliciting agents made competition felt most keenly at the local level, it was at the local
level that restraint could be most effectively exercised. The compact system was effective enough to call forth anti-compact legislation in various states.16
Companies frequently circumvented the anti-compact laws,
especially by promulgation of advisory rates. For example, when
the 1895 Missouri legislature amended the antitrust statute to
apply to insurance companies, the salaried rate maker of the
Association of Fire Underwriters of Missouri wrote to all companies doing business in the state that he was entering the business of selling rate books. The companies bought the rate service, and local agents formed informal, confidential clubs whose
objectives were to ensure "correct practices" in the underwriting
of fire risks. Little was put in writing and only when disaffected
members informed on their colleagues was there reliable information about these combinations. The scheme was effective,
but in Missouri, at least, prosecution was eventually successful
and seventy-three insurance companies were ousted in quo warranto proceedings.17

The ,boards were also concerned with fire prevention and control, through fire departments
and laws regulating construction. BREARLEY, 39-47.
14 BREARLEY, 63-64, 72-73, 78, 84; WANDEL, 16.
15 WANDEL, 51; FOURTEENTJi ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF FIRE UNDERWRITERS' AssN. OF
THE N.W. 49 (1883); WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE FIRE INS. INVESTIGATING COMM. R.EP. 38 (1913).
16 An unsuccessful bill was introduced in Michigan in 1883, and bills became law
in New Hampshire and Ohio in 1885, in -Michigan in 1887, and in many other states thereafter. N.H. Laws 1885, c. 93; Ohio Laws 1885, p. 231; Mich. Laws 1887, No. 285. BREARLEY,
76; WANDEL, 125; United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533 at 555, n.
43 (1944). The vulnerability of insurance to more powerful opposing business interests
was strikingly shown here, for the furniture manufacturers of Grand Rapids were said
to be ,behind the anti-compact law in -Michigan. BREARLEY, 76, 289.
17 In St. Joseph, Missouri, the association was called the "Underwriters' Social Club"
but the Supreme Court of Missouri was not convinced that the purposes were social:
"In order that [the secretary] might not become lonesome in the dub rooms ••• , and
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Even in states where anti-compact sentiment did not at first
produce restrictive legislation, there was a pervasive undercurrent of such feeling. Brearley counted four laws and two bills
in the 1880's, eleven laws and twenty-nine bills in the 1890's, and
five laws and sixty-six bills in the first decade of the new century. By 1912, twenty-three states had enacted such laws.18
Though enforcement was spotty, some states attempted rigorous
house cleaning. 19
The Wisconsin story shows the pervasive character of the
anti-compact sentiment. In 1887 Governor Rusk20 mildly castigated the "growing tendency of insurance companies to combine in fixing the rates of insurance. . . ."21 An anti-compact
bill was unsuccessfully introduced in the legislature.22 A legislator started to draft a bill to create a state fire insurance company,
but quickly abandoned it. 23 In 1889 two bills were introduced
and made some progress; one was "A bill to prevent combinations and 'insurance trusts' in the state of Wisconsin," while
the other would have appointed an assistant insurance commissioner in each locality to fix rates. 24 There were at least thirteen
more anti-combination bills in the next two decades. One bill
became law and forbade combinations to fix prices, except that
local associations of insurance agents were explicitly authorized

just to be social, each of the local agents of the defendant companies sent him their daily
reports, • . . and just to be social •he examined each report and . . . compared the
rates specified in each policy with the Fetter rates, and if there was a variance put a
slip on the report calling attention of the general agent of the company to the
variance.•.." Later even that much writing was dispensed with in an unsuccessful attempt to evade prosecution. State ex inf. Crow v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 152 Mo. 1
at 35-36, 52 S.W. 595 (1899). See also Aetna Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 131 Miss. 343 at 390,
94 S. 7 (1922), for a history of Mississippi Inspection and Advisory Rating Bureau, which
sought to escape the anti-compact law by removing the form of compulsion from the
organization. The effort proved very costly to the companies. See also WANDEL, 127-133,
for a discussion of the ways of meeting this unfriendly legislation.
18 BREARLEY, 291. There were also some repealer bills. Id. at 291-292. United States v.
Soutlleastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533 at 555, n. 43 (1944).
19 In 1900, for example, nearly a hundred companies paid $1000 fines to Missouri.
BREARLEY, 295. Even more striking is the levy of $8,000,000 in penalties against fire
insurance companies ,by 'Mississippi. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 131 Miss. 343 at 493,
~4 s. 7 (1922).
20 Later first United States Secretary of Agriculture. RANEY, W1scoNsIN, A STORY OF
.PROGRESS 271 (1940).
21 Wis. A. J. 25 (1887).
22 A. 844, Wis. (1887) (assembly bill).
23 On back of MS. bill A. 684, Wis. (1887).
24 A. 695, A. 694, Wis. (1889).
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to fix rates. 25 Notwithstanding its persistence, the oppos1t1on
to insurance rate fixing was mild; despite Populism in the 189O's
and the rise of Progressivism as a potent political force at the
turn of the century there was no serious talk of insurance rate
regulation in Wisconsin until 1911.
Anti-compact laws provided much too facile a solution to a
very complicated problem. Uncontrolled competition had recurrently proved disastrous to policy holders; the latter had much
at stake in the adequacy of premiums. Some states recognized
the danger of demoralizing rate wars by coupling prohibition
of compacts with denunciation of engaging in rate wars.26 Nor
did anti-compact laws truly restore free and open competition27
Regulation of insurance rates was a more sophisticated solution. It permitted concerted rate making but brought it under
social control. The pressures for the creation of rate setting bureaus were deeply rooted in the basic needs of the business, and
could not be denied. Before the turn of the century the idea of
regulation was already being discussed.28 Early in the twentieth
century, insurance rate regulation began.29
Kansas was early with a statute in 1909; it gave power to
the insurance commissioner to see that rates were adequate but
not excessive, and it also forbade discrimination against or in
favor of individuals, but did not deal with discriminatory classification.30 Litigation arising out of this act tested and established
the constitutionality of state rate regulation. The United States
Supreme Court held that insurance was affected with a sufficient
public interest for the state to control its price.31
In the following decades many other states enacted rate regulatory statutes, usually authorizing the formation of private rating
bureaus but controlling their practices.32 By 1944, only three
states had no social control of rate making.
Control was of two kinds. Some statutes reflected the earlier,

25 Wis.

Laws, 1897, c. 356.
26 PATIERSON, THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER IN THE UNITED STATES 273 (1927).
27 See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS

20 (1915).
•
28 A. 694, Wis. (1889) would have provided for rate setting by assistant insurance
commissioners located in each municipality, while A. 376, §6, Wis. (1899) would have set
up an ex officio state board to set rates for accident insurance.
29 See WANDEL, 134.
30 Kan. Laws, 1909, c. 152.
31 German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914).
32 PATIERSON, THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER IN THE UNITED STATES 274 (1927).
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somewhat naive, simple opposition to rate making combinations,
while others reflected the more sophisticated recognition of the
need for concert under social control. Twelve states had no explicit rate regulatory statutes, but only anti-combination provisions. Four of these anti-combination provisions were directed
specifically at insurance, while the other eight were general antimonopoly provisions in statutes or state constitutions. Fourteen
states had anti-compact provisions directed specifically to insurance, and forbidding combinations except as authorized by cognate rate regulatory statutes. Fifteen states had general anti-monopoly statutes or constitutional provisions and !1lso rate regulatory statutes. Four states had only rate regulatory provisions.
Thus in 1944 fifteen states either had no control over insurance
rates, or the unsophisticated anti-monopoly provisions which did
not regulate rate making but rather sought to preserve competition. In the other thirty-three states there was rate regulatory
machinery, usually coupled with anti-monopoly provisions.33 The
effectiveness of control varied from purely paper machinery in
some states to relatively complete and effective control in others
like New York, and direct state rate making in Texas.34 Even in
states with fairly effective control in leading lines of insurance
like fire and workmen's compensation, the control was relatively
ineffective or altogether lacking in other lines.35 It might be a
reasonably accurate generalization to say that in 1944, though
ostensibly there was control in two-thirds of the states, insurance
rate making was as yet largely uncontrolled in the United States.36

33 T:he above classification and count is from note, 33 GEo. L. J. 70 (1944); a somewhat different classification and count is to be found in Brief for the United States
130-131, United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533 (1944). No conclusions reached nere would be affected by the diversity. See also Brief for Appellees 51-52.
And see Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary
on S. 1362, H.R. 3269 and H.R. 3270, 78th Cong., 1st sess., 55-57 (1943).
34See Marryott, "Mutual Insurance under Rate Regulation," 15 I.Aw AND CoNTEM.
PROB. 540 at 558 (1950), for automobile rates in New York, and see Tex. Stat. (Vernon,
1936) art. 4878 et seq.
35 Moser, "Operation of Independents Under the Rate Regulatory Pattern," 15 I.Aw
AND CONTEM. PROB. 523 at 526 (1950).
36 See, e.g., l RICHARDS, INSURANCE, 5th ed., 216 (1952). The Department of Justice
studied regulation in the 43 states having rating bureaus in 1944, and thought that half
of the states left the public "virtually at the mercy of the combinations of fire-insurance
companies which fix and maintain :the rates to be charged by their members." Joint
Hearing Before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary on S. 1362, H.R.
3269, and H.R. 3270, 78th Cong., 1st sess., 55-57 (1943). And see id. at 102, when AttorneyGeneral McKittrick of Missouri alleged that none of the 18 states within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Western Underwriters' Association had been successful in controlling
the ·business in the public interest. But see id. at 124.
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THE SOUTHEASTERN UNDERWRITERS CASE AND ITS .AFTERMATH

From 1868 to 1944 it was generally assumed that insurance
was not commerce, and was not subject to federal regulation.87
An elaborate structure of state supervision might depend on this
assumption, for if insurance were subject to federal regulation,
broadly phrased federal statutes like the Sherman, Clayton, and
Federal Trade Commission Acts would be applicable to insurance, conflicting statutes of the states would be invalid, and still
other state statutes might conceivably fall as undue burdens on
interstate commerce. However, all of the cases treating insurance
as outside of commerce had been concerned with the validity
of state regulation, which the companies had vigorously fought
until the imminence of federal control made state regulation the
lesser of two evils.88 Since such regulation might be valid even if
insurance were commerce, where the local interest was dominant
and Congress had not acted, no cases clearly held that insurance
was not subject to federal regulation.
As the federal power under the commerce clause expanded
during the 1930's, it became increasingly clear that in due time
the complex national insurance business would be declared subject to federal control under the commerce clause.39 At an earlier
date, when state regulation was a reality while federal regulation was in abeyance, insurance men often called for federal
regulation of insurance. Insurance companies sought relief "from
the aggressive acts of hostile [state] legislatures."40 But as federal
regulation neared reality desire was replaced by pervasive fear.
In 1944 the Department of Justice prosecuted the Southeastern
Underwriters' Association and associated companies and officials
for violation of the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court declared
that insurance was commerce, and that the Sherman Act forbade

37 See United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533 at 578 (1944).
The notion originated with Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 168 (1868).
38See Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary
on S. 1362, H.R. 3269 and H.R. 3270, 78th Cong., 1st sess., 29-30, 61-62.
39 See, e.g., id. at 545, n. 23; note, 32 GEO. L. J. 66 at 73 (1943); Orfield, "Improving
State Regulation of Insurance," 32 MINN. L. REv. 219 at 221, n. 13 (1948); Nehemkis,
"Paul v. Virginia: The Need .for Re-Examination," 27 GEO. L. J. 519 (1939); GAVIT, THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 333-334 (1932). Actually, it was
already clear long before. See, e.g., Dawson, "A Case for National Supervision," 1 Moony's
MAGAZINE 312 at 314 (1905-1906) (Dawson was one of the leading actuaries of his time).
40 See ABA SECTION OF INSURANCE LAw PROCEEDINGS 133 (1944-1945) for summary of
bills introduced and other serious proposals. See also 'Murphy, "Insurance Under the
Commerce Clause," 33 IowA L. REv. 91 at 92-94 (1947); the quotation (in text above)
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rate making combinations, and some insurance men thought the
end of the world was come. 41
State officials, too, feared that the entire structure of state
insurance regulation was endangered by the decision. 42 So also
did the dissenting judges.43 This fear was exaggerated, as the
subsequent Robertson case demonstrated. Insurance was within
the concurrent power over commerce, and the states could continue to regulate its lo"cal aspects so long as Congress did not
occupy the field. 44 The most serious immediate danger to the
states was that state insurance taxation might be invalidated as
an undue burden on commerce. Companies refused payment of
taxes to the states, and a cry went up for legislation in Congress
to authorize continued state regulation and taxation. 45 Pending
decision of the Southeastern Underwriters case, there were unsuccessful attempts to exempt insurance from all federal regulation, and to validate continued state taxation and regulation. 46
In the next session of Congress after the Southeastern Underwriters case, there was virtually unanimous agreement that the
is from INSURANCE BLUE BooK (Centennial Issue, 1876-1877) 29-34 (c. VI, "Fire Ins.
1860-1869"). But the Temporary National Economic Committee recommended continued,
though strengthened, state regulation. TNEC Rep. (1938-1941) pp. 40-43, 586-587; and
see Address of Senator O'Mahoney, 26 A.B.A.J. 907 (1940).
41 See, e.g., editorial, THE NATIONAL UNDERWRITER, Life Ins. ed., June 9, 1944, p. I.
For a collection of quotations on this point, see note, 23 Cm-KENT L. R.Ev. 317 at 320
(1945).
42 E.g., Harrington (Insurance Commissioner for Massachusetts), "An Exploration of
the Effects of the S.E.U.A. Decision," 1944 INS. L. J. 590.
43 United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533 at 581 (1944) (C.J.
Stone); id. at 583 CT· Frankfurter); id. at 590 G- Jackson).
44Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440 (1946), upheld state regulation forbidding
doing of business by unadmitted insurers or unlicensed agents. State power did not
necessarily depend on congressional authorization through the McCarran Act. Cf. Paul
v. Virginia, 8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 168 (1868). The case of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943),
holding that the Sherman Act did not apply to an agricultural marketing combination
operating under authority of state law, suggests that regulated rate making by bureaus
might be valid even without congressional authorization. Note, 96 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 223
at 228 (1947). See also Guiher, "United States v. Southeastern Undenvriters' Ass'n: Its
Impact on Existing Federal Statutes," ABA SECTION OF INS. LAw PROCEEDINGS 33-37
(1944-1945), and SAWYER, INSURANCE As INTERSTATE COMMERCE 149-150 (1945), for an
indication .that the insurance companies had much hope for the doctrine of Parker v.
Brown.
45 "But this emergency is immediate and it is necessary to pass this legislation now.
The States do not know what to do with respect to the collection of taxes and the insurance companies do not know what to do with respect to the payment of taxes." 91
CONG. R.Ec. 1092 (1945).
46S. 1362; H.R. 3270, 78th Cong., 1st sess. (1943). The House bill passed the House
of Representatives -by a vote of 283 to 54, 90 CONG. REc. 6565 (1944), before it met the
vigorous and successful opposition of Senator O'Mahoney of Wyoming. TIME, Dec. 13,
1943, p. 82; NEW REPUBuc, May 29, 1944, p. 378.
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state regulatory structure and power to tax must be safeguarded
but there were conflicting views as to how far the act should
exempt insurance companies from existing applicable federal
legislation. After hurried consideratiOJ! of the problem,47 Congress
enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 48 which declared "that the
continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the
business of insurance is in the public interest," and provided in
section 2(b) that "No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for
the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically
relates to the business of insurance: Provided~ That after January I, 1948, ... the Sherman Act, ... the Clayton Act, ... [and]
the Federal Trade Commission Act, shall be applicable to the
business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law."
The proviso was a compromise, prepared by a conference
committee. It mediated between the faction in Congress that advocated complete exemption from the antitrust laws (the House
bill) and that supporting substantial surveillance by the federal
government (the Senate bill).49 It gave to the states the primary
responsibility to determine and enforce public policy with respect to rate making combinations, but preserved some role for
the federal government.
Through cooperative effort of the insurance industry and the
state commissioners of insurance, model bills regulating rate
making were prepared for submission to state legislatures.50 These
"All-Industry" bills were enacted with more or less variation in
substantially all of the states. 51 The motivation of state legislatures
was undoubtedly mixed, combining in varying proportions the
desire to improve the quality and scope of state regulation of
insurance rating, the desire to enable insurance companies to
escape the provisions of the federal statutes, and the desire to
maintain intact state control and taxation of the insurance business.
47 For a fairly detailed statement of the legislative history of the McCarran Act, see
note, 23 Cm-KENT L. REv. 317 (1945).
48 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §§1011-5.
49 Senator Murdock (Utah), 91 CONG. REc. 1480-1481 (1945).
50 See Moser, "Operation of Independents Under the Rate Regulatory Pattern," 15
LAW AND CONT.EM. PROB. 523 at 527 (1950).
51 By 1950 every state and territory had adopted the fire and marine bill, or the
casualty and surety bill, or both. See 1 RICHARDS, INSURANCE, 5th ed., 216-220 (1952).
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Under this model legislation the principle of concerted rate
making under social control was established as nation-wide policy
at the state level, in preference to the less sophisticated prohibition-of-concert principle of the Sherman Act. 52 The act provided
for rates to be ascertained on the basis of statistical experience,
which should be open to the public and to the insurance commissioner. It provided that rates be filed by each insurer or by
a rating organization it should select. Subscription to the rating
bureaus was to remain open to all insurers, and operation of
the bureaus was to be subject to state control. Finally, the rates
themselves might be disapproved by the commissioner. if they
were "excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory."53 This
adds up to a stringent system of regulation, in theory at least.
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF RATE REGULATION IN THE STATES

The theoretically stringent system of regulation provided by·
the "All-Industry" laws is somewhat less than uniformly stringent
in practice. Whether the statutes are implemented or not depends
upon the competence and attitudes of the commissioner a,nd his
staff, the adequacy of the commissioner's budget, and the cooperation of the attorney general's office, to mention only some obvious
prerequisites. It is not possible within the compass of a single
article to examine exhaustively the effectiveness of rate regulation, and broad generalizations have limited meaning because of
the great variation, both from state to state and from year to
year. Nevertheless, two particular examples may provide some
basis for judgments about the subject.

52,But see Brief for the United States 113-116, United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533 (1944), where the government sought to disparage the scientific
character of insurance rate making techniques, and contended that under present circumstances, there was no justification for any other policy than that of the Sherman Act.
The competitive principle was not entirely abandoned; the statutes permitted independents to file rates without joining bureaus and bureau members to file percentage deviations from bureau rates, ordinarily based on lower expense factors. See Kulp, "The RateMaking Process in Property and Casualty Insurance-Goals, Technics, and Limits," 15 LAW
AND CoNTEM. PROB. 493 at 513-514 (1950). Brook, "Public Interest and the Commissioners'
-All Industry Laws," 15 LAw AND CoNTElli. PROB. 606 (1950), makes a very persuasive
case for the proposition that rate regulation is unsound. Brook thinks that free competition would prevent excessive rates, while sufficiently stringent solvency laws would prevent
inadequate insurance rates from injuring policyholders.
53 See Gardner, "Insurance and the Anti-Trust Laws-A Problem in Synthesis," 61
HARv. L. REv. 246 at 260-265 (1948).
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Wisconsin
In Wisconsin the pervasive influence of Progressivism should
have ensured a hospitable climate for the development of insurance rate regulation, for regulation of railroad rates was central
to Robert M. LaFollette's Progressive program. Nevertheless,
serious interest in fire insurance rate regulation began rather
late in Wisconsin. In 1911 the governor received a letter from a
"consulting fire insurance expert in the public interest," who had
done work for the state of Kansas, the pioneer state in insurance
rate regulation. He sought professional employment on the
ground that Wisconsin fire insurance rates were too high. 54
Four months later the Wisconsin legislature passed a resolution
calling for the appointment of a joint legislative investigating
committee to survey the entire field of fire insurance, with special
attention to rates. 55 The committee's thoughtful report proposed
cooperative rate making under public control rather than a return to anarchic competitive practices. It urged compulsory membership in rate making bureaus for all companies.56 Despite the
committee's careful work, the insurance companies soundly defeated the rate bill in 1913, and a modified bill again in 1915.57
In 1917 a Stalwart administration introduced and passed a rate
regulatory bill, throwing doubt on the truth of Progressive allegations that the Stalwarts were entirely indifferent to the popular
welfare.58 The law provided for compulsory membership in rating bureaus, which were made subject to control by the commissioner. Membership in the bureaus had to be open, unreasonable

54 Letter from H.B. Seely of Chicago, dated Jan. 25, 1911, on file in the Wisconsin
Legislative Reference Library.
55 Wis. Laws 1911, J. Res. 40; and see id., c. 512 for the powers of the committee.
56 '\\71scONSIN LEGISLATIVE FIRE !NS. INVESTIGATING COMM. REP. (1913).
57 A. 901, Wis. (1913); Wis. A. J. 1112-1114 (1913). S. 88, Wis. (1915). Substitute
Amendment IS, unsuccessfully introduced by Senator Hansen, an insurance man, would
have emasculated the bill •by removing the commissioner's ratemaking powers. The unamended bill passed the Senate smoothly, but the insurance companies made a successful
stand in the Assembly. "Insurance Men Fight Rate Plan," MILWAUKEE J., May 26, 1915;
"Fire Insurance Rates Held High," W1scoNSIN STATE J., May 26, 1915. (All Wisconsin
newspaper clippings cited are on file in the Wisconsin Legislative Reference Library
unless otherwise noted). After much dispute, the bill was defeated in the Assembly by a
vote of 46 to 22, Wis. Assembly J. 1090 (1915), then reconsidered (id. at ll50) and
finally defeated by a vote of 41 to 35 (id. at 1373).
58 Wis. Laws 1917, c. 61. The ,bill, S. 8, Wis. (1917), was introduced by Stalwart
Senator Bennett, at the request of Stalwart Governor Philipp and his appointee, Insurance Commissioner Cleary. After some compromises on the terms of the bill, it passed
both houses unanimously, Wis. S. J. 361, Wis. A. J. 639 (1917). And see, for an example
of such charges, editorial, LAFoLLETIE's MAGAZINE, August 1916.
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or discriminatory rates were forbidden, and the comm1ss1oner
was empowered to order changes in rates after hearing.
The commissioner's power of control was no dead letter; 59
under some commissioners· the regulation of fire insurance rates
was fairly effective, but under others there was persistent public
dissatisfaction with the adequacy of regulation. In 1929, as a
result of conflict between mutual and stock companies over the
control of the Wisconsin Inspection Bureau, which had filed a
voluntary rate reduction without consulting the mutuals, an
effort was made in the legislature to break the bureau's practical
monopoly of fire rating. 00 The proposed legislation was not passed,
but an investigating committee was appointed instead. 61 This
committee recommended a revised and strengthened rating law
which was adopted in 1931.62 In 1943 another investigation was
unsuccessfully proposed, ·giving strong indication of some persistence of dissatisfaction with the extent to which fire insurance
rates were really regulated. 63
It was in the context of persistent, even if not intense, unhappiness about the sporadic effectiveness of rate regulation in
Wisconsin that the "All-Industry" bill was proposed in Wisconsin in 1947. The commissioner took the position that the
existing Wisconsin statutes were better. Deputy Commissioner
Timbers drafted a bill incorporating the existing statute, extend-

59 "Denies Plea for Boost of Risk .Rates," CAPITAL TIMES, Feb. 19, 1918; "Risk Concerns Oppose Smith Cut in Rates," .MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, May 24, 1926; and see "Increase
Farm Insurance .Rates," CAPITAL TIMES, Dec. 9, 1926, for an increase in farm rates permitted .to encourage commercial companies to write rural business.
60 A. 298, Wis. (1929); the ·bill died after a short, tempestuous existence. See Wis.
A. J. 1450 (1929); id. at 1533; id. at 1708; and see •~Mauthe Hits at Condition in
Wisconsin," CAPITAL TIMES, Feb. 3, 1929; "Given No Chance to Defend It," CAPITAL
TIMES, June 20, 1929.
From this point on, ·this section is dependent to a substantial extent on a letter from
Deputy Commissioner Charles J. Timbers, of the Wisconsin Insurance Department. Mr.
Timbers was kind enough to read a preliminary draft of this section and, drawing upon
his continuous experience of 42 years with the department and the Wisconsin Inspection
Bureau, made valuable suggestions for changes, most of which are now incorporated in
the text. Mr. Timbers is, of course, not responsible for any views expressed here.
61 Wis. Laws 1929, J. Res. 82.
62WIS. LEGISLATIVE INTERIM COMMITTEE ON FIRE INS. REP. (1931). Wis Laws 1931, c.
437.
63 J. Res. 56 A., Wis. (1943). T!he resolution failed •by a vote of 39 to 33, most of the
opposition coming from Republicans and the support from Progressives and Democrats.
Wis. A. J. 1241 (1943); id., at 3-7 for party affiliation. The sentiment for the probe was
based on the spread .between premimns received and losses paid of $128 million to $52
million in five years, thus raising clearly the issue of the meaning of "reasonable rates."
See "Fire Insurance Rates Are Debated Before Committee," SHEBOYGAN PRESS, April 29,
1943.
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ing it to allied lines of insurance, providing closer supervision of
rating bureaus, and fixing a definite rating formula limiting
profits. This bill was defeated and the "All-Industry" bill was
adopted, with a number of minor amendments proposed by the
commissioner.64 The bill did not basically strengthen the Wisconsin law, nor was it responsible for the ensuing period of relatively more effective regulation of fire insurance rates. N evertheless, beginning soon after the 1947 law there was a period in
which fire insurance rate regulation was more effective. A number
of rate hearings were held in 1948; fire statistical plans were developed and rate formulas devised. In 1950 the commissioner
held a far-reaching hearing, which resulted in substantial revision
of rates. 65 Perhaps the most significant new factor in 1950 was
the intervention of local government officials, who were politically
motivated to demand lower rates. Though they were of relatively
little help in the hearing process itself, the demand of the mayor
of Milwaukee for lower rates in his city had much to do with
getting the hearing called initially. 66 The size of fire rate reductions was quickly caught up in political controversy, 67 and the
policyholder's battle for lower rates was also taken up as a journalistic crusade. 68 This combination of forces kept the matter before
the public. Nevertheless, despite the continued pressure, fire
insurance rate regulation was relatively ineffective after the 1950
reduction, until late 1955.
64 Wis. Laws 1947, c. 487. Letter from Mr. Timbers, Nov. 21, 1957.
65 Indeed, in Wisconsin the commissioner's office urged the principle of a 2½%
underwriting profit as compared with 5% accepted generally. In 1950 a compromise was
reached, the companies accepting the commissioner's rate cut in return for his deletion
from the order of any mention of the rate of underwriting profit. See, e.g., "Charges Fire
Insurance Firms Attempting to Delay Rate Cut," CAPITAL TIMES, Aug. 15, 1950; "$1,036,000
Rate Slash is Reaffirmed," CAPITAL TIJ1rns, Aug. 30, 1950; "Fire Insurance Firms Drop
Fight," WISCONSIN STATE J., Oct. 5, 1950; "Fire Insurance Rate Slash to Stand, Report,"
GREEN BAY PRE.55-GAZETIE, Oct. 19, 1950. The issue was still alive in 1955. See, e.g., "6%
Insurance Margin Upheld," WISCONSIN STATE J., Jan. 14, 1956. (There was a 1% catastrophe reserve allowance, hence the profit margin talked about was really 5%.) It should
also be pointed out that the percentage of profit on capital and surplus might be far
more, because (1) the premium income might greatly exceed the capital and surplus
invested in the ,business, and (2) the companies invested their assets and received investment income not only on capital and surplus, but also on the prepaid premimns belonging to the policyholders. Hence, the 5% limitation, or even the 2½% limitation, was
a far less stringent public control than existed on public utilities.
66 "Fire Insurance Cut, City Aim," 'MILWAUKEE J., Feb. 2, 1950. The League of Wisconsin Municipalities soon took up the fight, and even urged state rate making, as in
Texas, "Lange Doubts Value of State Fire Insurance Rating Bureau," GREEN BAY PRESSGAZETIE, Oct. 31, 1950. See also "Fire Policies Probe Is Set," MILWAUKEE J., Feb. 8, 1951.
67 See, e.g., "Insurance Rate Cut Far Too Small, Schmitt," CAPITAL TIMES, July
19, 1950.
68 By the CAPITAL TIMES of Madison.
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From 1917 workmen's compensation insurance rating was under a regime of social control even more strict than that for fire
insurance, at least so far as the basic statute was concerned.69
Likewise, a rating law for automobile liability insurance was
passed in 1919.70 This law was inadequate, however, and the commissioner supported the passage of the casualty and surety insurance "All-Industry" bill in 1947.71 Outside the fire and compensation fields, however, actual regulation was not effective; the
casualty rate division was inadequately staffed and was not very
active. It approved automobile rate filings without public hearings, because of the lack of enough competent personnel in the
division to review the statistical data. 72
From 1948 to 1950 there was a short burst of activity in supervision of rate making, especially in the fire insurance field; from
1950 to 1955 enforcement lagged. In 1955 a timely vacancy in
the commissioner's office coincided with an intemperate controversy between Madison's Capital Times and the fire rating bureau
over the question of proper rates, which resulted from approval
of rate increases by the retiring commissioner over the protests
of his deputy and the fire rating division. The governor then appointed to the office a vigorous commissioner, prepared to intervene decisively in the public interest. As soon as he took office,
he called a public hearing; his action resulted in an eleven percent
reduction in fire rates, effective August 1, 1956. An additional
six percent reduction was protested by the bureau, and at present
writing is in litigation before the Wisconsin courts. The new
commissioner also reorganized the Wisconsin Insurance Department, putting all rate regulation under one division and increasing the effectiveness of control. 73
In 1957 the commissioner went even farther. He took a position much in advance of that of insurance commissioners generally and urged enactment of a statute to give him control of
69 Wis. Laws 1917, c. 637; in 1913 insurers were already compelled to file their rates
and adhere to them, Wis. Laws 1913, c. 599.
70 Wis. Laws 1919, c. 136; and see Wis. Laws 1923, c. 281. See Wis. Laws 1919, c.
655 for surety rates.
71 Wis. Laws 1947, c. 521.
72 See "Fire Insurance Premiums Are $55,728,082 Greater than Losses in 3 Years,"
CAPITAL TIMES, ,May 19, 1948; "Auto Insurance Rate Hike Effective Monday," CAPITAL
TIMES, April 15, 1948; "Have We any Regulation of Insurance Companies in Wisconsin?"
editorial in CAPITAL TIMES, April 20, 1948; "No Hearing on Boost in Car Surety Rates,''
CAPITAL TIMES, Oct. 8, 1951.
73 Letter from Deputy Commissioner Timbers, Nov. 21, 1957. WIS. !NS. Co111111R. ANN.
REP. 7-22 (1957).
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the rates in credit life insurance, a new and rapidly growing
field. The 1957 Wisconsin Legislature enacted such a statute.
In August 1957, the commissioner demanded a twenty-five percent cut in credit life insurance rates. 74 At this writing, it appears quite likely that some such reduction will soon be put into
effect. There is every indication that rate regulation generally,
in the hands of this vigorous commissioner, will be more effective in Wisconsin than heretofore.75
It seems fair to conclude that in the middle 1950's, insurance
rate regulation is fairly effective in Wisconsin. Immediately prior
to this time, in the earlier years of the decade, it was much less
adequate, especially in the casualty field, despite the great importance of automobile insurance in the family budget, which
in midcentury substantially exceeded the importance of fire insurance.76 The Southeastern Underwriters case and its aftermath
did not create any sudden upsurge in regulatory activity in Wisconsin. The sporadic development toward more effective regulation continued, without a decisive break with the pre-1944
past. Real regulation is only partially the result of improved statutes. It depends, too, on the channeling of pressures, especially
through municipal politics, in such a way as to compete effectively
·with the highly organized insurance industry. It also depends on
the vigor and the attitudes of incumbent commissioners. To
what extent the aggressiveness of the present commissioner represents a trend that will last beyond his term in office, it is too
early to .tell. To whatever extent effective regulation has not
yet become permanently established in Wisconsin, there remains
potential pressure for federal regulation. 77

74 "Rogan Calls for Credit Insurance Rate Regulation," CAPITAL TIMES, May 8, 1957;
Wis. Laws 1957, c. 321, §4.
75 "Asks Credit Insurance Rate Cut," CAPITAL TIMES, Aug. 14, 1957.
76 Letter from Deputy Commissioner Timbers, Nov. 21, 1957. In 1955, Wisconsin
Auto Liability premiums were $42,650,239, Auto Property Damage premiums were
$18,374,857, and Auto Physical Damage premiums were $31,034,904, compared with Fire
premiums of $34,576,521, and Extended Coverage premiums of $12,246,391, Wis. INs.
COMMR. ANN. REP. 36 (1956).
77 Missouri is a medium-sized state with a turbulent history of vigorous attempts
to enforce anti-combination statutes, with varied results. See State v. American Ins. Co.,
355 Mo. 1053, 200 S.W. (2d) I (1946), for a review of Missouri's litigation over the question
of rates; note, 33 GEo. L.J. 70 at 80-82 (1944); Stelzer, "The Insurance Industry and the
Antitrust Laws," 1955 !Ns. L.J. 137. The Missouri attorney general instigated the investigation that led to the indictments in the Southeastern Undenvriters case, Joint
Hearing before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary on S. 1362,
H.R. 3269, and H.R. 3270, 78th Cong., 1st sess., 25 (1943). And see id., 62-63, 82-84 (1943).
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Utah
In this smaller state, there is a much shorter history of rate
regulation. In fact, it was only under the compulsion of the
McCarran Act that rate regulatory laws were first passed in
1947. 78 In the years since a regulatory statute has been on the
books of the state, there has been only one incident involving
the justification of filed fire insurance rates, perhaps partly
because on only this one occasion was there any substantial increase in rates. The Utah Fire Rating Bureau, which is a branch
of the Pacific Fire Rating Bureau, is the authorized filing agent
for all but a handful of the fire carriers in the state of Utah.
On January 22, 1954, the bureau filed new rates, effective April
1, involving reductions in household and farm insurance rates,
but increases in mercantile and commercial building rates. The
new rates were voluntarily filed, and represented a net reduction
in premiums for the state. The mercantile policyholders were
organized in such a way as to be able to resist the raises effectively,
and through existing trade associations the merchants brought
pressure to bear on the state governmental machinery. On February 15, the Insurance Division and its parent, the Department
of Business Regulation, issued an order suspending the new
rates pending a hearing to determine whether there was any
justification for the increases in mercantile rates, and why the
reduction was not larger for the household and farm rates. Hearings were held on two different days, and the matter then was
taken under advisement by the agency. On April 9, the bureau
made a new filing with larger reductions for home and farm
rates, and smaller increases for the mercantile and commercial
risks. On request of the bureau, the department permitted the
withdrawing of the previous filing, dismissed the hearings with
prejudice, and accepted the new filing, effective May 1, without
further hearing.79
This incident, like the increased effectiveness of Wisconsin
fire insurance rate regulation after 1950, illustrates one of the
apparent prerequisites for effective regulation, that the pressures from insurance consumers be focused so they can be felt
78 Utah Laws, 1947, c. 63.
79 Notice of Hearing and

Order To Show Cause to Uta:h Fire Rating Bureau and
Harold S. Morr, Manager, dated February 15, 1954; Order of Dismissal and Allowing
of Withdrawal of Rate Filing on January 22, 1954 and Approving Filing -Made April 9,
1954, dated April 9, 1954.
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by insurance department officials through the political machinery
of the state. This seems true at least when the budget and staff
of an insurance department are inadequate. Thus no one in the
Utah insurance department is equipped by training or experience
critically to scrutinize filed rates and supporting statistics. As
a result, filed rates are accepted without question except when
pressures are sufficiently concentrated to be felt through the
political mechanism. This is not a criticism of the department
personnel; inadequate rate regulation is inevitable with the
present staffing of the department. The concentration of pressures for regulatory scrutiny of rates is to be expected when
organized groups like merchants are affected, but not ordinarily
when unorganized homeowners are involved, unless rates of
insurance are seized upon as an issue in municipal politics, as
has occurred in Wisconsin. As a result control may be expected
to be haphazard, inertia being what it is in human affairs. Indeed reductions in rates may be too large for well-organized policyholders, resulting either in an inadequate rate structure, or in
discrimination against unorganized policyholders, such as homeowners. Regular and adequate regulation seems dependent upon
the staffing of insurance departments with trained personnel who
develop routines for and a vested interest in the systematic handling of the problem. In the absence of special pressures, the Utah
department relies heavily upon the bureau determinations, even
to the extent of using them as a basis for approving or rejecting
deviations or non-bureau filings. The absence of effective regulation does not mean that rates are not voluntarily reduced by
the bureau in the light of experience, nor does it necessarily mean
that rates are excessive, but it does mean that rates are set by a
private body not responsible to the public, and not effectively
regulated by a public agency.
Even when pressures from organized groups of consumers or
through the political mechanism do operate, they seek only to
force down the rates of premium. More important for the long
term welfare of the public is the maintenance of adequate rates
of premium. Since the liighly organized insurance industry is
vitally concerned with that problem, it is perhaps supererogatory
for anyone else to worry about it, and yet some responsible insurance officials in Utah profess concern with the present adequacy of fire insurance rates. This concern is less with the adequacy of Utah rates than with adequacy on a national basis,
where mounting losses, they allege, threaten widespread insol-
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vency of fire insurance companies. 80 Despite this pessimism, Utah
rates are even now under reconsideration by the bureau in the
light of Utah experience alone, and conceivably may be reduced
in the near future. There will undoubtedly be reluctance to
make reductions as large as the statistics seem to warrant, however. Officials point to the fact that Utah has a very low deviation
rate, i.e., even if the rates appear to be too high, competing companies have not filed deviations to any marked degree, thus suggesting
general underwriting judgment that deviations are
not justified even in the face of apparently excessive rates. The
companies fear quick reversal of Utah statistics, which are based
on a small premium volume, and which may be colored by the
fortunate absence in recent years of any major fires; they also
anticipate frequent voluntary adjustments by the bureau to the
extent the bureau thinks justified by the data.81 It is beyond the
scope of this paper to reach any considered judgment on the
complicated question whether the Utah premium rates are inadequate, excessive, or unfairly discriminatory. It seems, however,
that Utah premium rates are prima fade excessive and that the
public interest demands a far more careful scrutiny of the rates
than they are getting. But it is not enough for the commissioner
simply to insist loudly on rate reduction; he must do so with
careful regard for the vital need of the industry and the policyholder for adequate rates.
In other lines of insurance, regulation is less adequate than
in fire insurance, if that be possible. The power to regulate exists
on the books, but there has been no real control, in fact. Thus in
January 1957, Deputy Commissioner Hanson told the press of
an impending increase in automobile insurance rates. He is
reported as saying that the department accepted without question
the rates set by the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters
and the National Automobile Underwriters Association. In January 1958, however, when the commissioner announced another
sharp increase in the automobile insurance rates, public outcry
led to consideration by the attorney general, who ruled that the
rates were ineffective because of failure to comply with the rate
regulation law. Thus, at this writing, a hearing seems assured
on the merits of this latest increase. There is no real assurance,
however, that the incident will result in institutional changes.82

a

so Interviews with and letters from responsible fire insurance officials in Utah.
Bl Ibid.
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Ineffectiveness of regulation bears a close relation to inadequacy of staffs and budgets. The Utah Insurance Division expenditures for the year 1955 were $32,581.79, of which $3603.29 were
central administration expenses of the parent Department of
Business Regulation chargeable to the Insurance Division. Personal services in the department cost only $23,020.00. The inadequacy
of rate (and other insurance) regulation cannot be attributed
to the poverty of the state, however, for the department collected
in fees a total of $93,637.13 for the services rendered by the staff.
The Insurance Division thus makes a profit for the state of Utah
of over $60,000 out of the fees collected to pay for the department's services, in addition to one and two-thirds millions of
dollars of premium tax collections intended for the general fund.
The department's budget must be at least tripled before the
state can justifiably plead poverty as an excuse for failure adequately. to regulate insurance. 83
In Wisconsin the department's budget was about $200,000
in the same year, yet it would be hard to regard even Wisconsin's
rate regulation as fully adequate.84
It seems fair to state on the basis of the data presented above
that there are states in which rate regulation in the insurance
field can hardly be regarded as adequate, if by "adequate" we
mean that public officials actually scrutinize and either approve,
or, with knowledge of the facts, fail to disapprove the rates filed
by rating bureaus. Of course the "All-Industry" laws do give to
all commissioners the power to regulate, and when specific pressures are applied to the state's political machinery, there may
be specific acts of regulation. But systematic and constant surveillance over rates is lacking in some states. In other states there
is reasonably adequate regulation in some lines of insurance, but
not in other lines. And finally, there may be a few states where
regulation is real, effective and complete.85

82 "Car Owners Face Insurance Rate Jump," SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Jan. 16, 1957.
"Legality Clouds Rate Hike on Auto Insurance," and editorial, "Public Entitled to Proof
on Rate Boost," SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Jan. 22, 1958; "Car Insurance Boost Ruled Not In
Effect," and editorial, "Increasing Your Car Insurance," DESERET NEWS, Jan. 22, 1958;
"Insurance Boost Illegal, State Attorney Decides," SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Jan. 23, 1958.
83 UTAH !NS. COMMR. ANN. REP. 98 (1956).
84 WIS. INs. COMMR. ANN. REP. 8 (1956). And see p. 561 supra.
85 If the amount spent for insurance department salaries is regarded as some indication of the presence of qualified personnel for rate regulation, Vermont, with $15,510.23,
North Dakota, with $28,656.92, Idaho with $24,992.90, can hardly have adequate rate
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MEANING oF THE McCARRAN-FERGusoN AcT

We now have some indication of "the extent to which [the
insurance] business is ... regulated by State law." It remains to
inquire what indications there may be as to the future course of
public control of insurance rate making.
Public policy with respect to the insurance business was not
clearly defined before 1945. The relatively naive trust-busting
policy of the Sherman Act was in effect in some states. This
policy assumed that combinations were per se bad, and sought to
forbid them. A more sophisticated policy was manifest in those
state statutes which permitted or encouraged rate making combinations, but sought to bring them under public control. The
latter clearly represented the historical trend; it was more realistic in seeing the dangers of unrestrained competition as well as
of uncontrolled combination.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act recognized the merits of this
kind of discriminating control, as opposed to the inflexible policy
of the Sherman Act. It encouraged the states to regulate more
adequately, but reserved some degree of £ederal control by
making the Sherman, Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission
Acts applicable to the insurance business "to the extent that such
business is not regulated by State law." The historical contribution of the McCarran Act thus seems to be the formulation of
a federal public policy that real regulation of insurance rate
making at the state level is preferable to the enforcement of a
non-regulatory federal anti-combination policy, but that the latter
is preferable to unregulated rate making by combinations of
insurers. Thus, the Judiciary Committees of both House and
Senate stated that "the Congress proposes by this bill to secure
adequate regulation and control of the insurance business." 86
An obvious question arises: is the All-Industry bill the kind

regulation. Wyoming's total department expenditures were $35,644.03 (including the
Inheritance Taxes Department and the State Fire Marshal); South Dakota, $40,123.04;
New Hampshire, $52,307.65. The probability is high that some of these states, perhaps
all, have grossly inadequate rate regulation. Even states with adequate insurance department budgets may have inadequate regulation of rates for other reasons. The figures
above came from annual reports that were at •hand. They are not in all cases the most
recent figures and they are not always strictly comparable, but they sufficiently make
the point. ,Marryott, "Twelve Years of Insurance as Commerce-Prospects for the Future,"
24 lNs. COUNSEL J. 191 (1957), throws some light on the adequacy of state rate regulation
from the company standpoint.
86 H.

Rep. 143, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 2 (1945); S. Rep. 20, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 2 (1945).
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of regulation "by State law" that excludes the operation of the
stipulated federal acts, in cases where in fact the commissioner
lacks the staff, or the budget, or the talent, or the disposition, to
do a real job of regulating. The answer turns on the meaning
attributed to the word "regulate."
Two views have been vigorously espoused: one is that the
passage of legislation is the only kind of "regulation" necessary
to satisfy the proviso of section 2(b), 87 while the other is that only
active regulation under the statute will satisfy the proviso.88
Strong arguments can be made for both views.
The most persuasive argument that the enactment of a statute
alone is sufficient to satisfy the proviso would seem to rest upon
the probable reluctance of the federal courts to take on the
task of ascertaining when there is "regulation." How can the
court say that there is not regulation, when the statute gives
to some public official the power to review rates and disapprove
them? What standards are to be set up to determine when "power" becomes "regulation"? Must the statute require the commissioner actually to approve filed rates, or is it sufficient to give him
power to disapprove, if he wishes, rates "deemed" approved a
specified time after filing? Must there be prosecutions under the
statute, or orders by the commissioner to reduce or reconsider
rates or change classifications? Must there be a functionary in
the insurance department qualified by training or experience to
understand the rate making process? Or is it enough that someone
be assigned the responsibility of reviewing rates? The requirement that regulation be real in order to exclude federal control
puts an impossible burden on the court-so goes the argument.
Rather than accept the burden, the court will interpret the
proviso as being satisfied by the mere enactment of legislation.
It is doubtful, of course, whether the task the court would have
under the interpretation demanding adequate regulation is any
more difficult than a multitude of problems the court solves
regularly.
If the statute is interpreted as requiring more than mere
87'E.g., Orfield, "Improving State Regulation of Insurance," 32 MINN. L. REv. 219 at
224 (1948).

ss E.g., Raymond Harris, Deputy Superintendent and Counsel, New York State Insurance Department: "While the court may not undertake to substitute its judgment for
that of the insurance commissioner in deciding whether state laws should be invoked in
a particular case, it is hardly likely that the court, in interpreting Public Law 15, would
accept formal •legislative action as complying with the act." 4 NEW YoRK STATE INS. DEPT.,
EXAMINATION OF INS. COMPANIES 19 (1954).
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enactment of regulatory statutes by the states in order to exclude
the application of the federal antitrust laws, it might be plausibly
argued, though probably not successfully, that the Sherman Act
as thus applied would be unconstitutional for vagueness. How
could insurance companies and rating bureaus be sure when the
states in which they operated were regulating enough to satisfy
the proviso? To determine in advance whether they were complying with the law would be very difficult, and the variable factor
would not even be within their control. In 1920 the Supreme
Court struck down provisions of the Lever Act making it unlawful willfully "to make any unjust or unreasonable rate or
charge in handling or dealing in or with any necessaries," on
the ground that the act created no ascertainable standard of
guilt. 89 In 1946, on the other hand, the Court upheld against the
same challenge a statute forbidding coercion of a radio broadcaster to employ persons "in excess of the number ... needed." 90
It seems doubtful if the present Court would invalidate for indefiniteness this statute dealing with economic regulation, at
least as applied to those clear cases where the state did not in
fact regulate at all. The doctrine is based on a constitutional requirement of notice, described by the Court in the Petrillo case:
"The language here challenged conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices. The Constitution requires no more."91
The statute in the present case seems to meet this test. Moreover,
here the indefiniteness is not in the prohibition itself, but in an
exception to the prohibition in favor of the defendant. Finally,
even if it were held unconstitutional if sanctioned by an indictment, it might not be for purposes of a cease and desist order,
which makes the statute more definite prospectively, and does
not punish prior violations of the statute alone. 92 Although tii.e
argument to the constitutionality of the Sherman Act as thus applied is not absurd, it does not seem likely to convince the Court.
On the other hand, the word "regulate" usually connotes
89 United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921). But compare Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), where Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, created
a requirement of specific intent and thereby overcame ,the vagueness of a statute punishing deprivation of constitutional rights.
90 United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. I (1947). And see Gorin v. United States, 312
U.S. 19 (1941).
91 United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. I at 8 (1947).
92 For a general discussion of the problem of indefiniteness, see comment, 53 MICH.
L. R.Ev. 264 (1954).
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something more active than mere paper machinery. Webster
defines "regulate" as "to govern or direct according to rule ... ;
more narrowly, to bring under the control of law or constituted
authority...." The Oxford Universal Dictionary adds the notion,
"to subject to guidance or restriction ...." Both suggest affirmatively enforcing policy-not merely stating it. The word "regulate" thus seems more consistent with a requirement of meaningful regulation than with mere legislation.93
Litigated cases give relatively little help in determining the
meaning of "regulate." Nearly always they were concerned to
delimit the outer boundaries of power to regulate, not to determine the minimal connotations of the word. Nevertheless, there
is language in some cases contrasting regulation with legislation.
Thus, "the word 'laws' . . . is therein definitely related to the
legislature or to the legislative power, while the word 'regulate'
and kindred words are attributed to the adminstrative power
and duty." 94 Again, "regulation and legislation are not synonymous terms. As applied to the statute in question, regulation
means a reasonable supervision by a legislative authorized agency...." 95 Since the questions litigated were not germane to the
present problem, this language is hardly conclusive, but it does
suggest that "regulation" ordinarily means more than "legislation."
Only one case arguably deals with the precise issue before
us. In North Little Rock Transportation Co. v. Casualty Reciprocal Exchange,96 the Eighth Circuit upheld a summary judgment
of dismissal of a policyholder's action for treble damages under the
Sherman Act. The fact that the State of Arkansas had enacted

93 WEBSTER, NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 2d ed., 2099 (1934); OXFORD UNIVERSAL
DICTIONARY, 3d ed., revised with addenda, 1692 (1955).
94'Marsh v. Bartlett, 343 Mo. 526 at 540, 121 S.W. (2d) 737 (1938).
95 In re Northwestern Indiana Telephone Co., 201 Ind. 667 at 680, 171 N.E. 65
(1930). And see United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911), where on a question
of the validity of delegated power, the Court talks of regulation as an aspect of the administrative process.
96 (8th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 174, cert. den. 340 U.S. 823 (1950). National Cas. Co. v.
FTC, (6th Cir. 1957) 245 F. (2d) 883, cert. granted 78 S. Ct. 119 (1957), deals tangentially
with the analogous problem of the applicability of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
Since the commission was reaching for jurisdiction over the interstate advertising of mail
order insurers, irrespective of state regulation, the case does not deal directly with the
question of jurisdiction where there was legislation but no regulation in fact. For a
statement of this proposition, see Brief for the F.T.C. at 28. For present purposes, the
case seems to suffer from the same infirmity as the North Little Rock case. As the United
States Supreme Court has granted certiorari, :however, its opinion may throw some light
on the problem before us. See also note, 60 YALE L. J. 160 (1951).
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rate regulatory legislation under the McCarran Act insulated the
bureau and company from civil liability under the Sherman
Act. The court did not inquire beyond the fact that there was
legislation, but apparently the argument that inadequacy of regulation might bring the Sherman Act into operation was not
made to the court. The case thus seems indecisive on this question.
There is no "plain meaning" of the word "regulate." It
seems appropriate, therefore, to bring in legislative history as an
aid to interpretation.
Pending the enactment of the McCarran Act, Senator Radcliffe of Maryland exchanged a number of letters with President
Roosevelt, who made it clear that the administration was not
seeking federal regulation of insurance. He thought there was
"no conflict between the application of the antitrust laws and
effective State regulation of insurance companies, and there is
no valid reason for giving any special exemption from the antitrust laws to the business of insurance. The antitrust laws prohibit private rate fixing arrangements between insurance companies and acts of boycott, coercion, or intimidation. The antitrust laws do not conflict with affirmative regulation of insurance
by the States such as agreed insurance rates if they are affirmatively approved by State offi.cials." 97 In signing the bill he said:
"After the moratorium period, the antitrust laws ... will be applicable . . . except to the extent that the states have assumed the
responsibility, and are effectively performing that responsibility. . . . " 98 The day after he signed the act, the President said:
"Congress did not intend to permit private rate fixing, which the
Antitrust Act forbids, but was willing to permit actual regulation
of rates by affirmative action of the states." 99 Although what
the President said is hardly decisive as to the meaning of the act,
the strong leadership Roosevelt exercised in Congress gives his
intentions weight in providing background.
Attorney General Biddle also spoke for the administration:
". . . The view we hold toward insurance is not unlike our policy
toward railroad rates, that the fixing of rates by private groups ...
without active and definite state approval~ is a clear contravention,
97 91 CONG. R.Ec. 482 (1945). Italics added.
98 Mimeographed White House release, March 10, 1945, as quoted in Layne, "Multiple
State Regulation of Mail Order Insurance," 39 GEo. L. J. 422 at 425, n. 10 (1951). A weaker
version of the release is quoted in SAWYER, INSURANCE As INTERSTATE COMMERCE 66 (1945).
99 As quoted in ABA SECTION OF INS. LAw PROCEEDINGS 105 (1946).
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not only of the [Sherman] act, but of the whole theory that underlies the act, the theory that competition should be free unless
it is specifically regulated by the appropriate body." 100 These
comments from the administration emphasize the need for affirmative regulation, as opposed to the application of the usual
"deemer" clause, that rates are "deemed" approved unless disapproved within a specified time. The deemer clause tends to emasculate control by the commissioner.101 The requirement of affirmative approval seems crucial in Mr. Biddle's view; he thought
statutes containing the deemer clause would not satisfy the requirements of the McCarran Act. 102
The bill was introduced in the Senate on January 18, 1945.103
The President signed it less than two months later. This hasty
action attests the sense of urgency that was felt. Brevity of consideration made difficult the clear isolation of the issues involved,
and a wide variety of expressions are to be found in the Congressional Record as to the intent of the Congress. The basic
purposes of the bill were to preserve to the states the power to
regulate but to compel them to regulate more adequately. The
method was to permit to the states a moratorium within which
to set up the regulatory machinery. Senator Ferguson of Michigan thought the bill would permit the states to pass laws in conflict
with the Sherman Act during the moratorium, but Senators M urdock of Utah and O'Mahoney of Wyoming objected to any form of
the bill that would permit the states to authorize monopolies.
They sought to delete section 2(b), which provided that "No act of
Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede
any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the
business of insurance . . . unless such act specifically so provides. "104 The Senate then amended section 2(b) to provide that
"No act . . . except the . . . Sherman Act, and/or . . . the Clayton
100 Quoted in Dineen, "The Rating Problem," ABA SECTION OF INS. LAW PROCEEDINGS
104 at 105 (1946). He also said: "I think there is no doubt at all that insurance rates
which are approved by a state are not subject to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. By that
I mean that if a group of insurance companies agreed on rates and filed them with a
state commission or state body, and that body took active and definite action, made active
and definite approval of those rates, in that case I think the matter would not be involved
at all in the Sherman Anti-Trust Act." Ibid.
101 Id. at 107.
102 See Joint Hearing Before the Sub-Committees of the Committees on the Judiciary
on S. 1362, H.R. 3269, and H.R. 3270, Pt. 6, 78th Cong., 2d sess., 638 (1944). And see note,
96 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 223 at 230 (1947).
103 91 CoNG. REc. 330 (1945).
104 ld. at 478-483.
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Act" should apply to the insurance business unless specifically
made applicable thereto. 105 Thus, after the moratorium, rate
making combinations would be forbidden and the Sherman Act
policy would be paramount in the insurance field. As Senator
O'Mahoney expressed it, "There is no purpose to issue an invitation from the United States Senate to the States to enact laws
which would establish monopolies in this business." 106 In the
House, however, the bill was enacted in its original form, without the Senate amendment. 107 This version would make the
Sherman and Clayton Acts permanently inapplicable to insurance. On motion of Senator McCarran of Nevada, the Senate
refused to accede to the House version, and the bill went to a
conference committee consisting of Senators McCarran, Ferguson, O'Mahoney, and Representatives Sumners, Walter, and
Hancock. The committee unanimously agreed on the conference
form of the bill. To section 2(b) as found in the House version
was added the proviso that after the moratorium the Sherman,
Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission Acts should "be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such
business is not regulated by state law." This gave to the federal
antitrust legislation some restricted application to insurance after
the moratorium. 108
The Senate debated the conference committee report on February 26,109 and there were expressions indicating that two of
the Senate conferees thought real regulation was required by the
proviso. The following colloquy took place on that day:
Senator Ferguson: " ... insofar as the State is concerned
which has specifically legislated on the subject, the three acts
shall not apply."
Senator O'Mahoney: "I believe the Senator from Michigan went a little further than was his intention when he
said that if the States have legislated certain things will take
place. The bill says if the States have regulated." (Italics
added.)
Senator McCarran's view is very important for he introduced
the bill and was chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee
at 487, 488.
at 488.
at 1085.
at 1208, 1274, 1357. This form was a compromise between Senate and House
versions. See Senator Murdock, id. at 1481-1482.
109 Id. at 1442-1444.
105 Id.
106 Id.
101 Id.
108 Id.
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responsible for it. To Senator Murdock's question whether Senator White of Maine thought the Congress must act affirmatively
to occupy the field beyond the scope of state regulation, Senator
White replied:
"Not at all; that is not my view of the matter at all. My
view is that the State may regulate. If, however, the State
goes only to the point indicated,110 then these Federal statutes apply throughout the whole field beyond the scope of
the State's activity."
Senator McCarran: "That is a correct statement."
Senator Murdock: "Without any subsequent action on
the part of Congress?"
Senator White: "Without any subsequent action on the
part of Congress."

Senator Barkley (Kentucky): "I should like to ask, in this
connection, whether, where States attempt to occupy the
field-but do it inadequately-by going through the form of
legislation so as to deprive the Clayton Act, the Sherman
Act; and the other acts of their jurisdiction, it is the Senator's interpretation of the conference report that in a case
of that kind, where the legislature fails adequately even to
deal with the field it attempts to cover, these acts still would
apply?"
Senator McCarran: "That is my interpretation."
Senator Pepper of Florida then objected to the conference
report bill because he thought it "practically destroys the effect
of the Supreme Court decision, and I am against that...."

Senator McCarran: "The Senator is correct regarding the
3-year moratorium, but beyond that he is in error."
Senator McCarran subsequently changed his position. In a
letter to the Yale Law ] ournal, he said, " ... the intent of the Act
was not to accomplish any particular degree of stringency of
regulation, but to keep regulation at the State level, and forestall

110 The words "point indicated" have no clear antecedent in the language contained
in the preceding speeches. From context it seems to mean "enacting :but not enforcing
regulatory legislation." See last sentence of Senator Pepper's last preceding speech, id. at
1444, col. 2.
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Federal regulation. . . . " On the other hand he contemplated
that the legislation must meet certain minimum standards to satisfy the proviso. Once these minimum requirements were met, the
adequacy of state regulation was a matter of legislative and not
of judicial concern.111
It must be conceded that the language in the debates, while
suggesting the automatic application of federal antitrust laws if
there was only paper regulation by the states, is not definitive,
largely because it is not often clear whether the Senators were
talking about the adequacy of the scope of the legislation, or about
the adequacy of enforcement of legislation which was adequate in
scope. Nor were the Senators always clear whether under the
statute the states would be able to authorize rate bureaus, in
contravention of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Some Senators
were even concerned lest the passing of the act estop them from
voting later to subject insurance companies to the federal antitrust
laws.
At the insistence of Senator Pepper, the matter was put over
until February 27. He then bitterly opposed the bill on the
ground that the conference compromise enabled the states to
evade federal antitrust legislation by mere paper regulation. As
a result of his speech, or perhaps as a result of second thought
about the matter, Senators Ferguson, Murdock, and O'Mahoney
all seemed to feel it was for Congress to decide whether the state
regulation was such that the proviso should come into operation,
at least if there was legislation by the state at all. 112 This shift in
expressed intentions between February 26 and 27 should not
change the meaning of the conference bill. The earlier expressions by the conferees seem most likely to reflect accurately the
intentions of the conference committee.
It is not necessary here definitively to ascertain the meaning
of "regulate" in the proviso of section 2(b). For present purposes
it is sufficient that there be a reasonable case for the proposition
that the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade
Commission Act are applicable to the business of insurance when

111 Letter to Yale Law Journal, quoted in note, 60 YALE L. J. 160 at 163, note 11
(1951); McCarran, "Federal Control of Insurance," 34 A.B.A.J. 539 at 542 (1948); McCarran,
"Insurance as Commerce-After Four Years," 23 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 299 at 306 (1948).
112 91 CONG. REc. 1477-1482 (1945). Senator 1Murdock urged that the states be given
a chance: " ... "Why not be willing to have confidence that the States will do a good job
when they step into it?"
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there is legislation on the books but no regulation in fact. The
authors think that the case is reasonable; many other persons
have supported it less equivocally.113
Even if it be conceded that the Sherman, Clayton, and Federal
Trade Commission Acts are not automatically applicable to insurance if state regulation is not adequate, it at least seems clear
that Congress intended when it passed the McCarran-Ferguson
Act to re-examine the situation and legislate if necessary to bring
insurance rate making under suitable public control. A theory
of automatic application shows even more clearly the concern of
Congress that there be effective state regulation. 114 This concern
continued. Thus Senator McCarran wrote in 1948: "There is a
growing feeling in the Congress that the Federal legislature has
a positive responsibility to see to it that there is adequate regulation of insurance, by the laws of the several States, or by the
act of the industry itself, promulgated into law by the legislatures
of the States, if possible; and otherwise, by Federal laws enacted
by the Congress." He urged the industry to examine the adequacy
of state regulation: "Such re-examination is an obligation of the
industry, for while the final decision with respect to adequacy
will not be, necessarily, for the industry to make, the results of
a final judgment of inadequacy will be the industry's to bear."115
Senator O'Mahoney said in the Senate debate on the bill: "I
interpret that to be a clear statement that if the States do p.ot
regulate, the power of Congress to regulate is clearly enunciated.
I do not conceive this to be a grant of power to the States to au-

113 See Dineen, "The Rating Problem," ABA SECTION OF INs. LAw PROCEEDINGS 104
at 109-110 (1946); Berge, "Insurance and the Anti-Trust Laws," ABA SECTION OF !Ns. LAW
PROCEEDINGS 29 at 34 (1946-1947). At present writing, the extent of the Federal Trade
Commission's jurisdiction over accident and health insurance advertising under the proviso
in section 2(b) of the McCarran Act is a much discussed problem, and the result is uncertain. See McCarter, "Recent Misleading and Deceptive Mail-Order Accident and Health
Insurance Policies and Advertising." 1956 lNs. L. J. 247 at 260; note, 45 GEO. L. J. 85
(1956); American Hospital and Life Ins. Co. v. FTC, (5th Cir. 1957) 243 F. (2d) 719,
cert. granted 78 S. Ct. 120 (1957); Crafts v. FTC, (9th Cir. 1957) 244 F. (2d) 882; National
Cas. Co. v. FTC, (6th Cir. 1957) 245 F. (2d) 883, cert. granted 78 S. Ct. 119 (1957).
114 See Dineen, "T:he Rating Problem," ABA SEcrroN OF INS. LAw PROCEEDINGS 104
at 110 (1946); Sawyer, "A Program Under Public Law 15," ABA SECTION OF INs. LAw
PROCEEDINGS 115 at 118 (1946). And see Beach, "The Southeastern Underwriters Decision
and Its Effect," 1947 WIS. L. REv. 321 at 327; Murphy, "Insurance Under the Commerce
Clause," 33 IOWA L. REV. 91 at 94 (1947).
115 McCarran, "Insurance as Commerce-After Four Years," 23 NoTRE DAME LAWYER
299 at 308 (1948); and see McCarran, "Federal Control of Insurance," 34 A.B.A.J. 539
at 540-541 (1948); 'McCarran, "Congress and Federal Regulation of Insurance," ABA
SECTION OF INs. LAw PROCEEDINGS 29 at 33 (1947-1948).
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thorize by permissive legislation obviously adverse combinations
which would be against the public interest."116 Subsequently,
he reaffirmed that position: "It will not be sufficient . . . merely
to announce the principle or to pass laws in the several States
which merely formally assert state authority. If there is to be state
regulation, the States must have insurance departments which are
competent to regulate, that is to say, which are competent to examine, audit, and understand the complexities of the insurance
business." 117 Thus, if it does not show that the Sherman, Clayton,
and Federal Trade Commission Acts are automatically applicable
to insurance in the event state regulation is inadequate, the legislative history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act at least clearly shows
that it is the public policy of the United States that insurance
rate making be adequately regulated, preferably by the states,
but if not by the states then by the federal government.
CONCLUSION

If it be concluded, as the foregoing analysis suggests may be
permissible, that insurance rate making will eventually be regulated effectively, by the federal government if not by the states,
and if it be concluded that state regulation is, as yet, inadequate
in many of the states,118 it follows that the long-term danger of
a federal assumption of regulatory power over insurance is real.
Unless state regulation is sufficiently stringent to prevent the
development of substantial and organized consumer pressures, an
attitude favorable to federal intervention may develop, or federal
agencies may have excuse to expand the scope of their operations
into the insurance field. It is at least possible that the Department
of Justice might successfully assert federal power under existing
law, where state rate. regulation is nominal. It already has taken

116 91 CONG. REc. 1444 (1945); in the Southeastern Underwriters case, Justice Jackson
said: "I have little doubt •that if the present trend continues federal regulation will
eventually supersede that of the states." 322 U.S. 533 at 586 (1944). See also Patterson,
"The Future of State Supervision of Insurance," ABA SECTION OF lNs. LAw PROCEEDINGS
18 at 26 (1944-1945).
117 Address ·before New York Insurance Federation, Dec. 5, 1945, quoted in I RICHARDS, INSURANCE, 5th ed., 190, n. 3a (1952).
118 See Dineen (New York Insurance Superintendent), "The Rating Problem," ABA
SECTION ON INSURANCE LAw PROCEEDINGS 104 at 105 (1946), pointing out the inadequacies
of staff and the necessity of increased ·budgets and better personnel in order •to do the
job required.
·
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action against concerted activity thought to offend the Sherman
Act prohibition against coercion, boycott, and intimidation, and
is therefore watchful of insurance practices and could easily assume broader power.119 The Federal Trade Commission has already asserted jurisdiction over insurance companies in the accident and health field to an extent which is thought by the companies and the circuit courts of appeals to exceed its power
under the act. 120 However, the United States Supreme Court has
just granted certiorari in two of the cases circumscribing the
commission's power and the whole matter must be regarded as
undecided. It is even more likely that a reforming Congress may
step in and fill up the power vacuum left by the states, if the
consumer demand for regulation is not fully satisfied by state
action. It may be concluded, therefore, that the minimum condition for the sure preservation of state regulatory power over
the insurance business is not now fully satisfied. While it would
be extremely rash to predict the exact course events will take,
or even to asseverate that state regulation is inevitably doomed,
there is a real possibility that the federal government will enter
the field of insurance, and that its entrance will lead eventually to
total occupation of the field, and conceivably also to appropriation by the federal government of the substantial insurance tax
revenues which now go largely to the states. In light of this
danger, continuance of penny-wise policies of economy in budget
and staff for insurance departments may in the end prove to be
pound-foolish. If the states cannot do an adequate job, perhaps
a federal commissioner of insurance can. If effective regulation
is too expensive for some small states, the way is open for regional
cooperation in the regulation of rates. The possibility of interstate cooperative use of technical facilities and personnel is already provided by many statutes.121 Indeed, interstate rating may
be desirable to produce a large enough premium volume in all
classifications of risks to give credibility to the rate structure.122

119 See United States v. Insurance Board of Cleveland, (N.D. Ohio 1956) 144 F. Supp.
684, where pressure from the Justice Department seemed to have compelled the bureau
to terminate a number of restrictive practices. See also United States v. New Orleans
Ins. Exch., (E.D. La. 1957) 148 F. Supp. 915.
120 See note, 45 GEO. L. J. 85 (1956); note, 5 J. PUBLIC I.Aw 494 (1956); and see note
113 supra.
121See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. (1953) §31-2-14; 1 RICHARDS, INSURANCE, 5th ed., 295
(1952).
122 T:he extreme difficulty in computing a reliable rate structure in a small state may
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Interstate rating and regulation of rates would make possible
more adequate supervision within the reach of small state budgets.
The long history of cooperation through the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners provides an avenue for the solution
of the problem, if the states really wish to preserve permanently
their preeminence in the regulation and taxation of insurance.

be seen in the memorandum opinion in Matter of Idaho Surveying and Rating Bureau, in the Third Judicial District Court of Idaho, Civil Case No. 25750 (1955). The
trial brief of Petitioner (the Bureau) is an excellent explanation of the way in which
fire rates are made. See also Kulp, "The Rate Making Process in Property and Casualty
Insurance-Goals, Technics and Limits," 15 LAW AND CONTEM. PROB. 493 at 503-506 (1950).
And see Harrington (Insurance Commissioner of Massachusetts), "Administration of
Insurance Rate !Regulatory Laws," 15 LAW AND CONTEM. PROB. 597 at 602 (1950).
0

